AWS Identification and Entry Administration (IAM) is highly effective, however it’s also one of the vital complicated and irritating points of cloud safety. Safety groups wish to implement least privilege, however AWS IAM’s additive permissions mannequin, mixed with a number of coverage layers, makes it tough to handle permissions effectively. Builders, however, often encounter complicated permission errors, slowing down their work and creating friction between groups.
This complexity stems from how AWS IAM evaluates a number of coverage sorts collectively, figuring out entry primarily based on the sum of all relevant permissions. Over time, AWS has launched further coverage controls—IAM id insurance policies, service management insurance policies (SCPs), permission boundaries, session insurance policies, and useful resource management insurance policies (RCPs). Whereas these instruments present safety and suppleness, additionally they introduce challenges in enforcement and troubleshooting.
Organizations want a scalable technique to implement least privilege with out slowing down builders or spending extreme time managing IAM insurance policies.
Breaking Down AWS IAM Coverage Layers
AWS Identification and Entry Administration (IAM) is a strong framework that enables organizations to regulate entry to their cloud environments. Nonetheless, as cloud adoption has grown, IAM has developed right into a layered safety mannequin with a number of coverage sorts, every designed to deal with completely different points of permissions administration. To grasp why AWS IAM may be tough to handle, let’s break down its coverage construction and the way it has developed.
AWS IAM’s Many Layers: A Timeline of Rising Complexity
AWS IAM started with identity-based insurance policies, which granted or restricted permissions to particular person IAM customers, teams, and roles. As organizations expanded their cloud utilization, AWS launched further coverage sorts to supply better safety controls at completely different ranges.
Every of those coverage sorts was launched to unravel a particular downside: Proscribing permissions on the organizational stage (SCPs), implementing least privilege for IAM roles (permission boundaries), or controlling entry on the useful resource stage (resource-based insurance policies and RCPs).
Right here’s how IAM coverage sorts have developed:
Coverage Sort | Objective | Launch Date |
IAM (Identification) Insurance policies | Grant permissions to customers, teams, and roles. | 2011 |
Service Management Insurance policies (SCPs) | Prohibit permissions on the organizational stage (AWS Organizations). | 2017 |
Permission Boundaries | Outline the utmost permissions an IAM entity can obtain. | 2018 |
Session Insurance policies | Quickly restrict permissions throughout a session. | 2019 |
Useful resource Management Insurance policies (RCPs) | Restrict entry to AWS assets no matter identity-based insurance policies. | 2024 |
Whereas these insurance policies work collectively, understanding how they work together in AWS’s analysis course of is vital for stopping misconfigurations, lowering overprivileged identities, and sustaining safety at scale.
The AWS IAM Coverage Analysis Circulation: A Internet of Dependencies
AWS gives an IAM Coverage Analysis Logic diagram for example how insurance policies work together when a request is made.


At a excessive stage, when an IAM entity (like a consumer or position) makes an attempt an motion, AWS evaluates insurance policies within the following order:
- Specific Deny At all times Wins: If any coverage explicitly denies an motion, AWS instantly blocks the request, no matter any enable permissions elsewhere. Against this, an implicit deny means entry is just not granted until a particular enable coverage exists. AWS gives a deeper clarification of specific deny vs. implicit deny in its documentation.
- Organizations Useful resource Management Insurance policies (RCPs): RCPs apply on the AWS Group stage and outline most permissions for AWS useful resource sorts (e.g., all EC2 situations, all S3 buckets) throughout a corporation. If an RCP doesn’t explicitly enable an motion for a useful resource kind, it’s denied, no matter IAM id or useful resource insurance policies.
- Organizations Service Management Insurance policies (SCPs): SCPs apply on the AWS Organizations stage and outline permission limits for all IAM customers, roles, and service-linked roles inside an AWS account or organizational unit (OU). If an SCP doesn’t explicitly enable an motion, IAM id insurance policies can’t override it.
- Useful resource-Based mostly Insurance policies: These insurance policies are hooked up on to AWS assets (e.g., an S3 bucket, KMS key, or Lambda operate) and outline which AWS identities (customers, roles, accounts) can entry that useful resource. Not like SCPs and RCPs, they’re evaluated after organizational insurance policies.
- Identification-Based mostly Insurance policies: Hooked up to IAM identities (customers, teams, roles), these insurance policies grant or deny permissions to carry out actions on AWS assets. Nonetheless, they can’t grant permissions restricted by SCPs, RCPs, or permission boundaries.
- Permissions Boundaries: These outline the utmost permissions an IAM identity-based coverage can grant to a consumer or position. They don’t grant permissions themselves however act as a ceiling that IAM insurance policies can’t exceed.
- Session Insurance policies: These insurance policies are handed when assuming a task or federating a consumer and additional prohibit the momentary session’s permissions. They can’t grant extra permissions than the id’s current IAM insurance policies, SCPs, or permission boundaries enable.
This logic implies that a deny from any stage will override an enable, however discovering out which coverage blocked entry is commonly tough. A developer might even see a “permission denied” error with out understanding whether or not the problem got here from an SCP, an RCP, a permission boundary, or a useful resource coverage.
The Energy of SCPs & RCPs for Centralized Management
As cloud environments scale, managing IAM insurance policies on the particular person consumer, group, or position stage turns into overwhelming. Service Management Insurance policies (SCPs) and Useful resource Management Insurance policies (RCPs) shift permissions administration from a bottom-up to a top-down mannequin, making certain least privilege at scale with out micromanaging each IAM position.
Service Management Insurance policies (SCPs): Imposing World Guardrails
SCPs outline what actions can by no means be allowed throughout an AWS Group, overriding IAM insurance policies to implement safety at scale.
Key SCP Traits:
- Utilized on the AWS Group stage → Have an effect on all accounts, OUs, and linked accounts.
- Prohibit permissions however don’t grant them → SCPs solely block actions; they don’t assign entry.
- Override IAM insurance policies → If an SCP denies an motion, IAM insurance policies can’t enable it.
Instance SCP Use Circumstances:
- Deny dangerous actions globally (e.g., stop IAM position creation outdoors safety groups).
- Block entry to unauthorized AWS areas to implement information residency.
- Require MFA for all customers throughout a corporation.
Useful resource Management Insurance policies (RCPs): Locking Down AWS Sources
RCPs set permission boundaries for AWS useful resource sorts (e.g., EC2, S3, Lambda) throughout a corporation, limiting what IAM insurance policies can enable.
Key RCP Traits:
- Utilized on the AWS Group stage → Have an effect on whole AWS useful resource sorts, not particular person assets.
- Prohibit actions throughout all situations of a useful resource kind however don’t present fine-grained per-resource management.
- Forestall IAM insurance policies from exceeding the boundaries set by RCPs.
- Apply to each organizational identities and exterior cross-account identities.
Instance RCP Use Circumstances:
- Forestall public S3 bucket creation throughout a corporation.
- Restrict EC2 occasion creation to particular AWS accounts or OUs.
- Prohibit third-party entry to group assets.
Whereas SCPs management permissions on the id stage, RCPs implement boundaries on the useful resource kind stage, making certain constant governance throughout AWS environments.
SCP and RCP Fast Comparability
Coverage Sort | Scope | What It Controls | Overrides IAM Insurance policies? |
Service Management Insurance policies (SCPs) | AWS Group | Defines what actions can by no means be allowed throughout accounts. | ✅ Sure |
Useful resource Management Insurance policies (RCPs) | AWS Sources | Blocks entry on the useful resource stage, even when IAM insurance policies enable it. | ✅ Sure |
IAM Insurance policies | Customers, Teams, Roles | Grants or restricts permissions for particular identities. | ❌ No |
SCPs and RCPs present sturdy safety controls, however they don’t inherently implement least privilege. They solely make it potential. Least privilege isn’t a one-time repair; it’s an ongoing effort.
How Sonrai’s Cloud Permissions Firewall Tames the Chaos
The issue is that managing IAM permissions manually is error-prone and time-consuming, making it tough for safety groups to trace unused permissions, overprivileged identities, and dangerous third-party entry. Builders often encounter complicated permission errors, whereas safety groups lack visibility to diagnose points and successfully implement least privilege.
Sonrai’s Cloud Permissions Firewall solves these challenges with deep visibility, automated least privilege enforcement, and a shift from permission accumulation to default deny. This method helps organizations considerably cut back safety dangers and operational overhead.
Visibility for Quick, Correct Entry Management
Safety groups can immediately see who has entry, which permissions are literally used, and the place extreme privileges create danger. This allows them to rapidly diagnose permission errors, resolve entry points, and implement least privilege with precision.
Automated Default Deny at Scale
Sonrai flips the mannequin to default deny on the SCP and RCP stage, making certain:
- Unused permissions are mechanically locked down earlier than they change into a danger.
- Zombie identities and dormant roles are quarantined, stopping privilege escalation.
- Providers, areas, and third-party entry are blocked until actively wanted.
Seamless Entry Workflows
Sonrai enforces least privilege with out disrupting workflows by integrating Simply-in-Time (JIT) entry and Permissions-on-Demand (POD):
- JIT removes standing privileges, making certain no human customers have everlasting entry to vital manufacturing environments. As an alternative, entry is requested per session and permitted through Slack, Groups, or e mail. As soon as the session ends, entry is mechanically revoked.
- POD allows momentary permission elevation for customers with current base entry. If a cloud engineer wants elevated entry to change an EC2 occasion, they request particular permissions, that are granted for a restricted time earlier than being revoked mechanically.
By combining deep visibility, automated enforcement, and a default deny mannequin, Sonrai helps safety groups get rid of pointless entry, resolve permission errors immediately, and keep sturdy safety, with out slowing growth.
Conclusion
Managing IAM permissions manually is inefficient and dangerous. With out automation, safety groups wrestle to trace unused permissions, stop privilege creep, and implement least privilege with out disrupting growth.
Sonrai’s Cloud Permissions Firewall solves this problem by automating least privilege enforcement and establishing a default deny mannequin for permissions outdoors of permitted guardrails. Organizations that implement Sonrai’s answer see measurable enhancements in safety posture and operational effectivity, together with:
- 97% discount in time spent managing least privilege.
- 74% lower in developer entry requests.
- 92% discount in permissions assault floor.
Find out how Sonrai delivers measurable ROI for safety groups.
By shifting IAM administration from guide oversight to automation-assisted enforcement, safety groups can keep sturdy least privilege controls whereas protecting growth workflows environment friendly and uninterrupted.

